The lending channel model posits that control of deposits that have reserve requirements allows the Fed to constrain the loans to businesses and consumers that are the comparative advantage of banks. The constraint works because banks do not use traded assets and liabilities with no reserve requirements to offset the effects of variation in deposits on loans. The results presented here are more consistent with an alternative model in which profit-maximising banks vary traded assets and liabilities with and without reserve requirements to exercise profit opportunities in loans and so shield them from the Fed.
In the classical model, monetary policy affects real activity through interest rates. A wellknown problem with this story is that the effects of monetary policy on interest rates seem to be limited to short-term riskless rates, which are probably not very important in investment and other expenditure decisions.
The lending channel model proposes an additional source of influence for monetary policy. The outlines of the argument are: (i) through open market operations the Fed can control the supply of reserves; (ii) this affects the supply of deposit financing available to banks; (iii) this in turn affects the supply of bank loans available to borrowers. Through its effects on loans, monetary policy can have substantial effects on real activity, beyond its effects on interest rates. Kashyap and Stein (1994) give a clear explanation of the lending channel model and its history. They identify three conditions that must hold if the lending channel is to work (pp. 225-226) . '1. Intermediated loans and open-market bonds must not be perfect substitutes for some firms on the liability side of their balance sheet. In other words, the Modigliani-Miller capitalstructure invariance proposition must break down in a particular way, so that these firms are unable to offset a decline in the supply of loans simply by borrowing more directly from the household sector in public markets.
switching from deposits to less reserve-intensive forms of finance (for example, certificates of deposit [CDs] , commercial paper, equity, etc.) or by paring its net holdings of bonds.
3. There must be some form of imperfect price adjustment that prevents any monetary policy shock from being neutral. If prices adjust frictionlessly, a change in nominal reserves will be met with an equiproportionate change in prices, and both bank and corporate balance sheets will remain unaltered in real terms. In this case, there can be no real effects of monetary policy through either the lending channel or the conventional money channel.'
Price stickiness (conditions 3) is always necessary if monetary policy is to affect real activity, and for the purposes of the discussion here, I do not quarrel with this assumption. Having written on the issue (Fama 1980 (Fama , 1985 (Fama , 1990 , I also accept condition 1. Specifically, banks are privy to information about customers as depositors and borrowers. This makes banks efficient monitors of the debt of small firms with serious asymmetric information problems. As a result, borrowing via bank loans is less costly for such firms than issuing debt in the open market. A similar argument holds for loans to consumers.
The validity of condition 2 is my focus. There are three potential problems. First, if Fed actions affect the supply of bank loans, this may not have important effects on the total supply of loans if other intermediaries that are not subject to reserve requirements can in large part offset the lending actions of banks. Kashyap and Stein (1994) discuss this issue, which is likely to have become more serious with the expansion of the financial sector and nonbank intermediaries since 1994. The effectiveness of substitutes for bank loans is, however, an empirical issue on which I offer no evidence.
I examine two other implications of condition 2 that are also critical for an effective lending channel, one about bank liabilities sheets and the other about bank assets.
Liabilities -It is not profitable for banks to largely offset the effects of a decline in deposits on their ability to make loans by issuing debt that has no reserve requirement.
Assets -Banks also do not shield loans from the effects of Fed actions to control deposits by substantially varying their inventories of traded liquid assets.
The rest of the paper presents evidence on these two conditions. Section I presents tables and charts that examine the evolution of bank asset and liabilities. These simple results raise serious doubts about the importance of a lending channel. Section II turns to regressions that describe the interactions among bank assets and liabilities. These results suggest more directly that during 1952-2011 the lending channel never has much bite. The regressions seem more consistent with a simple model in which the financing of banks is driven by profit opportunities in the loans to consumers and businesses that are their comparative advantage, and throughout 1952-2011, banks use no-reserve liabilities and liquid traded assets to shield loans from the potential effects of Fed actions to control deposits. To keep the table manageable, and  to focus on major trends, Table 1 shows non-overlapping two-year averages of the quarterly asset variables expressed as percents of commercial bank total financial assets each quarter.
Two general categories of assets are important in the lending channel model. The first is assets for which banks are efficient monitors because of their relations with borrowers. In the lending channel these assets are called loans, and I use that term here. In terms of Table 1 , I take loans to include business loans (BLoans), consumer credit (Credit), and mortgages (Mort, which are mortgages issued and held by the banks). These loan assets are the core business of banks, that is, the assets for which banks in principle have comparative advantages as issuers. They are also the assets most directly linked to real activity, which makes them the assets of interest in the lending channel model. Business loans (BLoans) rise from less than 20% of bank financial assets in 1952 to around 30% in the mid-1960s. From 1962 to 1988 business loans are the largest bank asset. They decline as a share of bank assets after 1982, from near 32% to less than 20% after 2002. Though less important than business loans, consumer credit (Credit) follows a similar first-up-then-down pattern, rising from less than 8% to around 14% of bank financial assets and then declining in the late 1990s.
A standout feature of Table 1 is the steady increase in mortgages issued and held by banks (Mort), from less than 10% of commercial bank financial assets in 1952 to 41% at the beginning of 2007 (buried in the two-year averages in Table 1 ). Thus, commercial banks move steadily into mortgages long before the boom in real estate prices preceding the2008 recession. Moreover, the Mort series does not include liquid mortgage securities, which are the agency backed securities (Agency) and collateralised mortgage obligations (CMOs) in Table 1 . (The CMO series includes other bond types but is dominated by CMOs in the later years of the sample.) Beginning in the mid-1980s, mortgages in one form or another are typically the largest component of aggregate commercial bank financial assets.
In the lending channel story, traded assets, that is, securities bought and sold in capital markets at relatively low cost, are the second general category of bank assets. In terms of Table 1 traded assets include Treasuries (Treas), short-term open market paper (Paper), securities (primarily mortgages) backed by Government agencies (Agency), CMOs and other bonds (CMOs), municipal securities (Munies), and a general class of miscellaneous assets (the Rest).
I treat the sum of cash and reserves held at the Fed (Base in Table 1 ) as a third category of assets, used to provide transaction services to customers and to satisfy reserve requirements. Reserve requirements are important in the lending channel model, but their effects are captured better by the quantity of liabilities subject to reserve requirements than by base assets.
In 1952 Treasuries are by far the largest asset, accounting for almost 40% of commercial bank financial assets, probably as a result of World War II and the Korean War. Holdings of Treasuries decline rapidly thereafter, and after 1999 they are less than 2% of bank financial assets. Base assets also fall, from near 14% of bank financial assets in 1952 to less than 1% preceding the massive injection of reserves by the Fed in 2008. This decline in the relative importance of base assets corresponds to a decline in the relative importance of deposits subject to reserve requirements, which is important in the discussion of bank liabilities below.
Offsetting the decline in Treasuries, the shares of other traded assets in total financial assets typically increase more or less steadily after 1952. Municipal securities (Munies) are an exception, first rising from around 6% of bank assets at the beginning of the sample to around 15% in the early 1970s, and then falling below 3% around 1994. Figure 1 shows the paths of base, traded, and loan assets as shares (proportions) of total commercial bank financial assets. Traded assets decline from almost 50% of financial assets in 1952 to the mid-30s in the 1960s and thereafter. The sharp initial decline is mostly the fall in holdings of Treasuries early in the sample period. Loans rise from around 35% of bank assets in 1952 to around 60% in 1969, and they are above 60% from 1973 to 2009. At the end of the sample period, loans, for which banks in principle have a comparative advantage, are slightly less than 60% of bank financial assets.
In the lending channel model, banks have no comparative advantage in traded assets, and their role is to provide liquidity when needed to cushion large unexpected outflows of deposits unrelated to Fed actions. Moreover, because of their potential liquidity services in extreme circumstances, banks do not vary traded assets much in response to Fed actions to control deposits, and most of the response falls on loans and thus on borrowers who have little or no access to alternative forms of financing. This is critical for an effective lending channel.
Traded assets are, however, almost always more than 30% of the total financial assets of banks ( Figure 1 ). This seems extreme if they are held just to meet unexpected outflows of deposits. It seems more consistent with the alternative model outlined earlier in which banks hold liquid assets at least in part to neutralise the lending channel, that is, to absorb variation in deposits that might otherwise limit their ability to respond to profit opportunities in the loans that are their comparative advantage.
Figure 1 also seems to suggest that there is strong negative correlation between the variation in traded assets and loans, which would be directly damning for the lending channel model. This is, however, by construction, and it says nothing about the lending channel. Figure 1 shows the shares of base, loan, and traded assets in total bank financial assets, and the shares always sum to 1.0 (100%). Base assets decline rather smoothly to mid-2008, so the much larger swings in the shares of traded assets and loans must offset. To test the lending channel hypothesis that banks do not vary traded assets to accommodate variation in loan opportunities, Section II turns to regressions that use versions of the variables that are not subject to an adding-up constraint. The regressions point strongly toward the offsetting variation in traded assets that is a problem for the lending channel model but is in line with the simple alternative model. Table 2 shows the debt liabilities of banks, specifically non-overlapping two-year averages of the relative shares of different forms of debt that banks use to finance 7 195201 195304 195503 195702 195901 196004 196203 196402 196601 196704 196903 197102 197301 197404 197603 197802 198001 198104 198303 198502 198701 198804 199003 199202 199401 199504 199703 199902 200101 200204 200403 200602 200801 200904 201103 Date ( themselves. In the lending channel model, two general categories of liabilities are of interest. The first is deposits subject to reserve requirements. The model posits that by controlling reserves the Fed can control these liabilities, and this allows the Fed to control lending by banks. Deposits with reserve requirements include checkable deposits, and for part of the sample period, small time and savings deposits, and large time deposits. In 1952 checkable deposits (CDep in Table 2 ) are 70% of bank liabilities, and until the late 1960s, they are the largest bank liability. The importance of checkable deposits declines almost relentlessly, however. After 1995, they are less than 20% of bank liabilities, and after 2001, they are typically less than 10% of the debt liabilities of banks.
In contrast, as a share of the debt liabilities of banks, small time and savings deposits (ST&SD) increase rather steadily during the sample period. ST&SD pull even with checkable deposits in 1968 and thereafter become the most important bank liability. The small reserve requirement on these liabilities is dropped in late 1982 with the passage of the Garn -St. Germain Act. Thereafter, small time and savings deposits, between 40% and 50% of bank liabilities, are beyond Fed control. Moreover, ST&SD are not a special preserve of large banks, and even for small banks they are not regionally restricted. Many small banks advertise their rates on small CDs (i.e., small time deposits) beyond their local regions, and many newspapers publish tables of CD rates offered by banks near and far, large and small.
Large time deposits (LTDs, i.e., large denomination CDs) are the third debt liability with reserve requirements, at least for part of the sample period. LTDs increase from about 3% of the debt liabilities of banks in 1952 to about 20% in 1974, but they begin to decline in 1982, and they fluctuate around 10% of liabilities after 1991. At the end of 1990, the reserve requirement on LTDs disappears, and thereafter checkable deposits (CDep) are only liability subject to reserve requirements.
Henceforth, I use the term deposits for liabilities with reserve requirements. Thus, deposits include checkable deposits, ST&SDs, and LTDs until 1983, checkable deposits and LTDs from 1983 through 1990, and only checkable deposits thereafter.
After 1999 LTDs are at least as important as checkable deposits in bank capital structures. This is also true for the catchall open market liability, paper, bonds, loans and advances (PBL&A), which slowly increases as a percent of debt liabilities and at the end of the sample period is similar in magnitude to checkable deposits. Beginning in 2001, miscellaneous liabilities (Misc in Table 2 ) are the second largest class of bank liabilities, accounting for 13% to 17% of total debt liabilities. In these later years, miscellaneous liabilities are primarily owed by banks to their holding companies. The increase in the importance of this liability suggests that a byproduct of consolidation in the banking sector is that smaller banks can access broader credit markets through their parent companies. This tempers the lending channel as a story for how Fed actions with respect to deposits constrain even small banks. Figure 2 summarises the evolution of loans (the sum of business loans, mortgages, and consumer credit) and deposits subject to reserve requirements. In the lending channel, deposits constrain loans because banks do not use other liabilities and traded assets to largely neutralise Fed control of reserves.
Until 1983, when the reserve requirement for small time and saving deposits (ST&SD) disappears, deposits with reserve requirements far exceed loans. Thus, in the early years of the lending channel model (KS cite Roosa 1951 , Brunner and Meltzer 1963 , Modigliani 1963 , Tobin and Brainard 1963 , and Brainard 1964 , the proposition that loans are constrained by the supply of deposits is perhaps most credible. The fact that prior to 1983 deposits are far in excess of loans can, however, also be read as bad news for the lending channel model since it suggests that Fed actions to control deposits are not likely to have much effect on the ability of banks to supply loans. Moreover, prior to 1983, traded assets, always a large fraction of total bank financial assets, are especially large (Figure 1 ). The regressions presented later suggest that during 1952-1982 offsetting variation in traded assets is especially important in neutralising the potential effects of variation in deposits on loans.
When the reserve requirement on ST&SD disappears at the end of 1982, the Fed loses control of this important source of bank financing, and deposits with reserve requirements drop far below loans. In itself, this may tend to increase the effect on loans of Fed actions to control deposits with reserve requirements since there is no longer an excess supply of deposits relative to loans. After 1982, however, banks regularly finance a large fraction of loans with no-reserve liabilities. It then seems likely that they vary these liabilities to offset Fed-induced variation in deposits, thus largely neutralising the lending channel. The regressions presented later confirm that after 1982 variation in no-reserve liabilities is the primary offset to variation in deposits in the financing of loans. Kashyap and Stein (1994) argue that because individual banks face upward sloped supply curves for no-reserve liabilities, they do not use them to largely offset the effects of Fed actions to control deposits. Modigliani and Miller (1958) would disagree. Thus, suppose a bank issues no-reserve liabilities to replace an equivalent amount of deposits. Since deposits stand in front of no-reserve liabilities in the priority structure, replacing deposits with no-reserve liabilities reduces the average risk and thus the average interest rate on no-reserve liabilities. More generally, the overriding message of M&M is that, absent frictions, a bank's cost of capital depends on the risk of its assets, not the way they are financed.
The gap between loans and deposits jumps again in 1991, when the reserve requirement for large time deposits disappears, leaving only checkable deposits subject to reserve requirements. As noted earlier, the relative importance of checkable deposits in bank financing declines during the sample period, and after 1995, they are less than 20% of bank liabilities. Thus, when the lending channel model reaches maturity in Kashyap and Stein (1994) , the deposits that drive the model's propositions are a small part of bank financing, and they fall to less than 10% of bank liabilities in the decade of the 2000s. Potential Fed control of 10% of bank liabilities does not seem to leave a lot of room for an effective lending channel -a conclusion also suggested by the regressions. 195201 195304 195503 195702 195901 196004 196203 196402 196601 196704 196903 197102 197301 197404 197603 197802 198001 198104 198303 198502 198701 198804 199003 199202 199401 199504 199703 199902 In the lending channel model, Fed actions to control deposits affect real activity by constraining the financing of the loans (business loans, mortgages, and consumer credit) that are the core business of banks and their most direct link to real activity. A working lending channel requires that banks do not use no-reserve liabilities and traded assets to largely offset the effects of variation in deposits. The alternative to the lending channel model posits that banks value flexibility in financing loans. Thus, they buy and sell traded assets and use no-reserve liabilities to neutralise the potential effects of Fed actions to control deposits on their ability to make loans.
The predictions of the two models center on the joint variation of loans, traded assets, liabilities subject to reserve requirements, and no-reserve liabilities. To describe the joint variation of the four variables, I use the regression,
In this regression, dLoans t is the change in loans in quarter t, dTraded t is the change in traded assets, dDep t is the change in deposits with reserve requirements, and dNRes t is the change in no-reserve liabilities. To put all variables in the same units, they are scaled by total financial assets at the beginning of quarter t and multiplied by 100. Thus, the variables are changes expressed as percents of lagged total financial assets. Dep t and NRes t change a lot when the deposits with reserve requirements change, and this would cause problems in regressions that include those quarters. To avoid these problems, 1952-1982, 1983-1990, and 1991-2007. Regression (1) is a simple way to describe how variation in loans is financed via the joint variation of traded assets, deposits, and no-reserve liabilities. Moreover, I argue that causation is not important for interpreting the results. Thus, estimates of (1) mix quarters when there may be variation in deposits due to Fed actions with quarters when the Fed is passive and variation in all variables is endogenous. Suppose the regressions say that traded assets and no-reserve liabilities are important in financing variation in loans. A proponent of the lending channel model may be tempted to argue that the result is due to quarters when the Fed is passive, and when the Fed acts to constrain deposits, there is little variation in traded assets and no-reserve liabilities to take up the slack. But if banks use large doses of traded assets and no-reserve liabilities to absorb variation in loans when deposits are unconstrained, it seems safe to presume that they also do so when the Fed constrains deposits. This presumption is central in my interpretation of the regression results.
Regression (1) has other issues. Since the four regression variables cover the total debt liabilities of commercial banks and all their financial assets except currency and reserves, it is perhaps surprising that the regression R 2 (Table 3) are not close to 1.0. There are two contributing factors. First, financial assets are not the total assets of banks, total debt liabilities do not include equity financing, and the links between changes in total financial assets and total debt liabilities become rather loose during the sample period. Concretely, in regressions of quarterly percent changes in total financial assets on quarterly percent changes in total debt liabilities, the regression slope falls from 0.93 (R 2 ¼ 0.98) for 1952-1982 to 0.85 (R 2 ¼ 0.77) for [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , and then to 0.82 (R 2 ¼ 0.76) for 1991-2007. Second, regression (1) imposes constant slopes, but the way banks mix the four variables probably varies quarter to quarter. The implied time variation in the regression slopes further dampens the regression R 2 . Time varying slopes are also a form of measurement error that produces biased estimates of the true average slopes. Given that there are three right-hand-side (RHS) variables, the exact nature of the bias is beyond (my) reach, but it may help explain why the intercepts in the estimates of (1) for the periods after 1982 are rather large (Table 3) .
The regression slopes in (1) are always large in economic terms and relative to their standard errors. This is almost foreordained, and the slopes are not in themselves much information about the lending channel. To see the point, suppose for the moment that loans and traded assets are all the assets of banks and banks are financed entirely with deposits and no-reserve liabilities, so
Suppose, for simplicity, the slopes in (1) are constant; that is, the way banks mix changes in the variables is the same every quarter. In this world, equation (2) is the fitted version of regression (1); that is, the regression fits perfectly (R 2 ¼ 1.0), the intercept is 0.0, the regression slopes are measured with perfect precision, and they are either 1.0 (dDep t and dNRes t ) or À1.0 (dTraded t ). The regression estimates in Table 3 do not collapse to (2) in part because the underlying true slopes in (1) probably vary from quarter to quarter and in part because the regression variables do not cover the total assets of banks or their total financing. The simple example nevertheless shows that large slopes estimates in (1) are likely and they don't in themselves allow us to evaluate the lending channel model.
To judge the lending channel model, I focus instead on the decomposition of the variance of quarterly changes in loans implied by regression (1). Specifically, I combine the slope estimates from regression (1) with the covariance matrix of the RHS variables to produce estimates of the contributions of the RHS variables (the three different forms of loan financing) and the interactions among them to the variance of changes in loans. Using s 2 and s ij to denote sample variances and covariances, the variance of the change in loans from regression (1) is
In the breakdown of the variance of the change in loans in (3), there are variance and covariance terms. Each variance term is the product of the variance of a RHS variable and the square of its regression slope in (1). Each covariance term is a covariance between two RHS variables multiplied by the product of their slopes in (1).
A variance term in (3) captures the contribution of a specific form of financing to the variance of the change in loans, holding the other two forms of financing constant. This is, however, an artificial exercise since the interactions among the three forms of financing are substantial, and they are important for judging the lending channel model. The interactions are captured by the covariance terms in (3). Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of the quarterly changes in the four regression variables and the correlations and covariances of the RHS variables. The covariance matrices in Table 4 , and the regression slopes and residual variances from Table 3 are the inputs for the estimates of the contributions to variance from (3), also shown in Table 4 . The contributions to the variance of dLoans t are expressed as percents of the variance of dLoans t . Specifically, each of the terms on the RHS of (3) is divided by the variance of dLoans t and then multiplied by 100.
Given the large regression slopes for the RHS variables (Table 3) , their standard deviations are important determinants of the variance terms in (3). Since the quarterly changes in all the variables are in the same units (percents of lagged total financial assets), their standard deviations are directly comparable. The standard deviations of quarterly changes in loans, traded assets, and deposits decline from 1952-1982 to 1991-2007 , and the decline is largest for deposits. The standard deviation of changes in deposits is more than 60% larger than the standard deviations of changes in traded assets and loans during 1952-1982, but the standard deviations of the three variables for 1991-2007 are almost identical. Thus, variation in deposits is likely to be an especially important contributor to the variance of dLoans t during 1952-1982. This is not surprising since deposits are the most important source of bank financing during this period.
Unlike the other variables, the standard deviation of quarterly changes in no-reserve liabilities increases from earlier to later periods in Table 4 . Changes in no-reserve liabilities Table 4 Means, standard deviations, correlations, and covariances of quarterly changes in commercial bank loans (dLoans t ), traded assets (dTraded t ), and liabilities that have (dDep t ) or do not have (dNRes t ) reserve requirements, and contributions to the variance of dLoans t.
This table presents summary statistics for the variables of regression (1) and the breakdowns of the variance of dloans t . Loans include business loans, mortgages, and consumer credit. Traded assets are everything else except currency and reserves. Dep includes checkable deposits, small time and savings deposits (until 1983 ) and large time deposits (until 1991) . NRes is total liabilities minus Dep. The changes in the variables for quarter t are in percents of beginning of quarter total financial assets. In the estimates of the contributions to the variance of dLoans t , X,Y is the contribution of the two covariance terms for X and Y in (3), where X and Y are the first letters in the variable names. Observations (quarters) in each period are 123 (2/1952-4/1982), 31 (2/1983-4/1990), and 67 (2/1991-4/2007 (Table 3) , the contribution to the variance of dLoans t of the variance term for no-reserve liabilities is likely to grow from earlier to later periods. This is not surprising given the increased importance of no-reserve liabilities in bank financing in large part due to the changes in liabilities with reserve requirements that separate the subperiods in the tests. The variance breakdowns from (3) change during the sample period. During 1952-1982 the variance term for the change in deposits (dDep t ) is the biggest contributor (223%) to the variance of the change in loans, and the contribution of the variance term for the change in no-reserve liabilities (dNRes t ) is relatively minor (20%). This is consistent with the lending channel model, which posits that most of the variation in loans is financed with deposits. The offsetting variation in traded assets (dTraded t ) is, however, also substantial; its variance term is 99% of the variance of loans during , and this is a problem for the lending channel model.
The contributions of the variance terms to the variance of dLoans t always sum to more than 100%. The offset comes from negative covariance terms in (3). The negative covariance terms capture offsetting interplay among deposits, traded assets, and noreserve liabilities in the financing of loans -in other words, flexibility in mixing different sources of loan financing that should be minor in the world of the lending channel model but is in fact substantial.
For each pair of RHS variables in (1), there are two (equal) covariance terms in (3), which are summed to produce the covariance contributions to the variance of dLoans t in Panel C of Table 4 . In the results for 1952-1982, the biggest negative covariance terms (summing to À217% of the variance of changes in loans) are from the interplay between deposits and traded assets, captured by a strong positive covariance between dDep t and dTraded t (1.88, Panel B of Table 4) multiplied by slopes for two variables that have opposite signs (0.92 for dDep t and À0.99 for dTraded t , Table 3 ). In words, during 1952-1982 bank financing is mostly deposits, and the strong positive covariance between changes in deposits and traded assets says that changes in deposits in part show up in traded assets. But changes in deposits that are absorbed by traded assets offset the effects of dDep t on changes in loans. Thus, when deposits go down, traded assets also tend to go down, which offsets the effects of the decline in deposits on loans. The offset is captured by a strong negative slope for dTraded t and a strong positive slope for dDep t in the dLoans t regression. The offset to the effects of variation in deposits on loan financing from traded assets is important during 1952-1982, when traded assets are an especially large fraction of total bank financial assets and deposits are an especially large fraction of total liabilities. The contribution of the covariance terms for changes in traded assets and deposits, À217% of the variance of dLoans t , is close to the 223% contribution of the variance of dDep t . The interplay between changes in deposits and traded assets is the big problem of the lending channel model during 1952-1982. Another non-trivial problem is the two negative 1952-1982 covariance terms in (3), summing to À50% of the variance of changes in loans, due to the strong negative covariance between changes in deposits and no-reserve liabilities (À0.61, Table 4) multiplied by large slopes for the two variables that have the same sign (0.92 and 0.70, Table 3 ). Thus, during 1952 Thus, during -1982 no-reserve liabilities are a minor source of financing relative to deposits, but variation in no-reserve liabilities nevertheless provides an important additional offset to the effects of variation in deposits on loan financing. This non-trivial problem for the lending channel model during 1952-1982 becomes its biggest problem later, when no-reserve liabilities become the most important source of bank financing.
During the brief 1983-1990 period, the slopes on the RHS variables in (1) are less extreme (Table 3 ) and the variances of dDep t and dTraded t decline. As a result, the contributions to the variance of changes in loans from the variance terms for dDep t and dTraded t in (3) decline. Variation in deposits is still a big contributor (111% of the variance of changes in loans), but the contribution of the variance of changes in traded assets becomes rather trivial (7% of the variance of dLoans t ). The variance of changes in no-reserve liabilities increases, however, and its variance term in (3) is 33% of the variance of changes in loans for [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Moreover, in the results for [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , the sum of the two covariance terms in (3) that capture the offsetting variation in dDep t and dNRes t is À69% of the variance of changes in loans. Thus, during 1983 Thus, during -1990 banks treat no-reserve liabilities as an important offset to variation in deposits in the financing of loans, which is a contradiction of the lending channel model.
During the recent 1991-2007 period, no-reserve liabilities are the most important source of loan financing, and traded assets return to prominence. The variance terms for dNRes t and dTraded t in (3) are 93% and 61% of the variance of changes in loans. In contrast, the variance term for changes in deposits drops to 21% of the variance of loans, which does not suggest an important lending channel. Moreover, even small effects of changes in deposits on loans seem to be ruled out by the two large negative covariance terms (summing to À39% of the variance of the change in loans) due to the offsetting variation in deposits and no-reserve liabilities.
During 1991-2007 no-reserve liabilities and traded assets are the important sources of financing for variation in loans. During this period, there are two strong negative covariance terms in the variance of dLoans t due to the emergence of a strong positive covariance between changes in traded assets and no-reserve liabilities (0.72, Table 4), combined with opposite slopes on the two variables (À0.80 for dTraded t and 0.58 for dNRes t , Table 3 ). Thus, during this period, when no-reserve liabilities are a much more important source of bank financing than deposits, there is strong offsetting interplay between traded assets and no-reserve liabilities in loan financing. This is another manifestation of flexibility in mixing sources of loan financing that is a problem for the lending channel model.
The contributions of residual variance in regression (1) to the variance of dLoans t increase from 11% for 1952-1982 to 45% for 1991-2007 (Table 4) . Residual variance arises in part because debt liabilities are not the only source of financing for banks loans. Residual variance also arises, probably in large part, because the way banks mix sources of financing changes from quarter to quarter; that is, the regression slopes in (1) are not constant, producing a type of measurement error that inflates residual variance. As a result, the estimated contributions to the variance of dLoans t from the RHS variance and covariance terms are somewhat muted estimates of average contributions. Perhaps ironically, such measurement error is a problem for the lending channel model since it is due to quarter-by-quarter flexibility in mixing different forms of loan financing.
Conclusions
The lending channel model posits that by varying reserves the Fed can control the deposit financing available to banks, and control of deposits constrains financing of the loans (business loans, mortgages, and consumer credit) that are the comparative advantage of banks as issuers and their most direct link to real activity. The constraint works because banks do not use no-reserve liabilities (liabilities that have no reserve requirement) and traded assets (for which banks have no comparative advantage) to largely offset the effects of Fed control of deposits on loans.
How serious are the model's problems? The decomposition of the variance of changes in loans in (3) provides an answer. In the results for 1991-2007 the contribution of the term for the variance of changes in deposits in (3) is minor relative to contributions of the variances of changes in traded assets and no-reserve liabilities. It seems safe to rule out a non-trivial lending channel during this period. The model has its best shot during 1952-1982, when loan financing is primarily from deposits. During 1952 During -1982 , however, the negative covariance terms in (3), due to the offsets to variation in deposits from traded assets and no-reserve liabilities, are together a more extreme fraction of the variance of changes in loans (À267%) than the variance term for changes in deposits (223%). It seems that even during this period, banks use traded assets and no-reserve liabilities to largely offset the potential effects of variation in deposits on loans. During the brief [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] period, the term for the variance of changes in deposits in (3) contributes much more to the variance of loans than any other variance term in (3), but the negative covariance terms due to the offset to variation in deposits from no-reserve liabilities are a worthy competitor (À81% versus 111% of the variance of changes in loans). Finally, to the extent that the increasingly large residual variance terms in (3) are due to quarter-to-quarter variation in the way banks mix different forms of loan financing, they are a blow to the lending channel model.
All this seems more in line with the simple alternative to the lending channel model in which profit-maximising banks routinely use multiple sources of financing (deposits, noreserve liabilities, and traded assets) to accommodate the profit opportunities in loans that are their core business.
